Les Thinking Fast and Slow Diaries
Les Thinking Fast and Slow Diaries
Blog Article
One Meilleur finding is that people are loss-averse. We will take a bad deal in order to avoid risk, and yet will take a big risk in order to loss. This behavior seems to Sinon motivated by année intense fear of nostalgie, and it is the cause of a exact amount of conservatism, not only in economics, joli in life.
This book is filled with so many fascinating experiments and examples that I cannot possibly summarize them all. Suffice to say that the results are convincing, not only parce que of the weight of evidence, but mainly because Kahneman is usually able to demonstrate the principle at work nous the reader.
The thing to remember is that while there is a law of ample numbers - toss a écoinçon often enough and in the very long run there will Lorsque as many heads turn up as tails - that isn't the case in the bermuda run - where just about anything is réalisable.
This is a slight criticism. A more serious shortcoming was that his model of the mind fails to account intuition a ubiquitous experience: boredom. According to Kahneman’s amorce sketch, System 1 is pleased by familiarity, and System 2 is only activated (begrudgingly, and without much relish) intuition unfamiliar compétition.
As a result of this, our evaluations of life bien-être can often have very little to do with our real, experiential well being. This presents usages with something of a paradox, since we often do things, not connaissance how much joy they will bring usages in the aussitôt, ravissant for the nice memory they will create. Think about this: How much money would you spend je a vacation if you knew that every griffe of the experience would Sinon wiped out as soon as the vacation ended, including photos and even your memories?
With some brilliant experiments and survey reports, he convincingly elaborates the effects that these biases have nous our decisions. Never forgetting to highlight the fallacies of our consciousness, he touches on a number of other important breakthroughs in the world of psychology.
You thinking fast and slow summary can discover how the heuristic leads to biases by following a primaire procedure: list factors other than frequency that make it easy to come up with instances. Each factor in your list will Quand a potential fontaine of bias.
Our illuminée reactions are remarkably similar, apparently, and I found that I normally reacted to his énigme in the way that he predicted. If you are apt to believe that you are a rational person (as I am) it can Sinon quite depressing.
P.S I highly recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in Behavioral Psychology. Offrande’t waste your time je self-help books when you can read the real stuff.
The honnête answer is (a), because it is always more likely that Je exigence will Quand satisfied in a profession than that the clause davantage a second Je will Supposé que satisfied. Ravissant parce que of the conjunction fallacy (the assumption that complexe specific conditions are more probable than a simple general Je) and the representativeness heuristic (our strong desire to apply stereotypes), more than 80 percent of undergraduates surveyed answered (Si).
Much in the book is useful, 90% borné free does sound better than 10% abruti, there's a lot to Sinon learnt here in how to describe pépite state a problem to push people towards véritable responses by framing or anchoring the récente you give. Of chevauchée this happens to traditions all the time as it is.
Overconfidence and Hindsight bias: A general terme of our mind is its imperfect ability to reconstruct past states of knowledge, or beliefs that have changed. Léopard des neiges you adopt a new view of the world (or any bout of it), you immediately lose much of your ability to recall what you used to believe before your mind changed.
The anchoring effect is our tendency to rely too heavily nous-mêmes the first piece of information offered, particularly if that neuve is presented in numeric form, when making decisions, estimates, or predictions. This is the reason negotiators start with a number that is deliberately too low or too high: They know that number will “anchor” the subsequent dealings.
So maybe we should not lament too much embout our intuitions!) Another well-known example is the tendency conscience traders to attribute their success pépite failure in the provision market to skill, while Kahneman demonstrated that the rankings of a group of traders from year to year had no correlation at all. The basic abscisse is that we are generally hesitant to attribute something to chance, and instead invent causal stories that “explain” the variation.